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This newsletter contains a selection of the articles published in "Défense Européenne" Nos. 74,76 and 77.

A large part of these articles have been translated into English by students at [ISIT Paris](http://www.isit-paris.com).

Our sincerest thanks to Christine Cross, who proofread the newsletter and translated the editorial and the article on page 11.

## Editorial



### CASE FOR A EUROPEAN NETWORK OF EURODEFENSE ASSOCIATIONS

The EURODEFENSE network is currently made up of 15 independent national associations, all dedicated to creating a credible, united and efficient system of European defence. Their members come from a variety of backgrounds (political, diplomatic, economic, academic, social, civil servants and members of the armed forces), irrespective of their political affiliations. The associations' objectives and operating methods are set out in a charter approved in Athens in late 2006. By forming a network, the individual associations have access to new insights, can produce common proposals and gradually forge a European defence and security culture. Further information about this network may be found at [www.eurodefense.eu](http://www.eurodefense.eu) where you will also be able to access the pages corresponding to each of the chapters, including the French chapter directly available at [www.eurodefense.fr](http://www.eurodefense.fr).

There are a number of reasons why I have chosen to focus this editorial on the EURODEFENSE network, not least because Eurodéfense-France hosted the network's annual international gathering in Paris last May. More importantly, as its President since the beginning of the year, I am conscious of the need to raise the network's profile in France, if not in other member countries. It is in this capacity that I would like to share my thoughts with you on the fundamental nature of the president's role.

For the chapter presiding over the network and, by extension, the Council of Presidents, the human and financial implications are legion, not least those connected with organisation of the international gathering, the accompanying visits, meetings and receptions, making the necessary transport arrangements and, most of all, staging a high-level public conference. It is customary for the network president to be from one of the two European Union member countries presiding over the Union for one of the two halves of that year, this facilitating lobbying activities in Brussels and Strasbourg and making it easier to put proposals jointly

approved by the presidents of the national chapters to the European authorities.

But the role of president is more than just chairing a handful of meetings. More particularly, it involves taking the lead, acting as coordinator and spearheading lobbying activities.

**Lobbying:** Finding ways of exploiting a well-established, recognised network to bring ideas and suggestions to the attention of the national and European authorities. For this, you need a robust set of arguments from within your own chapter that can then be set against those of your colleagues. You must also be open to their opinions and accept that these may differ. You have to be prepared to work towards compromises that can be generally supported and agreed. Lastly communications using the latest, most efficient tools and systems are of the essence.

**Coordination:** Ensuring that, while the means may differ, our end targets, timelines and initiatives remain compatible from one chapter to another. Obviously, the national chapters need to share details of their plans and activities, maintain contact with the observatories and working groups, foster commonalities and their implementation, while ensuring that the messages disseminated are suitably target-oriented.

**Leadership:** Orchestrating our individual activities as chapters and our collective activities as a network. Here it is vital to make more extensive and properly managed use of internet facilities (our common website, the newsletter, webinars, etc.), more frequent contacts between active chapters, in other words greater recourse to videoconferences between presidents and/or secretaries general and, of course, to continue to meet in the flesh twice a year, given the importance of interpersonal relations.

This has been our approach since the beginning of the year, an approach we firmly intend to pursue with both constancy and

**Jean Fournet**

Lieutenant General (Armament Corps, retired)  
President of EuroDéfense-France

# The Strategic Compass and European diplomacy in action

By

**François Laumonier**, Former French Ambassador to Lithuania, EuroDéfense-France Board member

**Nathalie de Kaniv**, Member and Delegate of EuroDéfense-France, Secretary General of Europe-IHEDN

There is a growing awareness of European diplomacy among Europe's citizens, and among our allies and adversaries. The concept remains, however, abstract, a state of affairs not helped by the determination of the world's powers to exclude the European Union (EU) from their international strategy and security exchanges. They prefer to discuss such matters among themselves, dealing separately with each of the EU Member States.

These tactics are clearly apparent from the current crisis with Russia. Over European security, Moscow is out to force Washington into direct exchanges and has no desire to engage in dialogue with the countries immediately concerned. This is indicative of Russia's determination to recover its status as a major power, a status seriously diminished since the 1990s. For Moscow, Europe has no place in European security and defence. But the crisis just a stone's throw from Europe's boundaries has already had the two positive effects of spurring Europe into action and prompting it to act fast. This immediately led to consultations with its American allies with the result that, in its talks with Moscow, Washington now intervenes on behalf of both the United States and its European allies. Action undertaken by Berlin and Paris, after consultations with the other EU Member States (the three Baltic countries in particular), also bear witness to more a concerted approach. NATO also seems to be benefiting from the crisis. Ironically, it would seem that Russia's President is now NATO's biggest lobbyist. Interaction between NATO and the EU in the current crisis could herald the start of a new relationship between the two organisations.

Meanwhile, within Europe in-depth discussions are going on over the *Strategic Compass* for Defence and Security in Europe, a document which should make it possible to define the main lines of thrust for European defence between now and 2030. The aim is to give added consistency to current European defence initiatives and boost the EU's resilience and response capacities in an increasingly hostile environment marked by the many crises on its doorstep: in Ukraine, Belarus, the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Near East. While it may be internal to the EU, this document (co-produced by the Member States) is bound to have an effect on the notion of European diplomacy and will undoubtedly give it a new dimension.

## Member States' inclusive and innovative European diplomacy

Diplomacy is traditionally defined in relation to the sovereign prerogatives of the State. It consists of such things as defending and promoting national interests, demonstrating the State's ability to exert an influence, carry moral weight on the international scene, withstand threats and provide a credible level of security. For European diplomacy, the bar is clearly set extremely high. Yet, the EU cannot afford not to engage in diplomacy common to its 27 sovereign Member States. European diplomacy is therefore unique in being twofold, firstly, in relation to the Member States that shape it

and, secondly, vis-à-vis the rest of the world, as the voice of Europe. These two aspects are an integral part of ongoing work on the *Strategic Compass*.

The initiative was first launched in June 2020 under the German Presidency of the Council of the European Union and was then carried forward under the Portuguese and Slovenian Presidencies. It is scheduled for approval in March 2022 during the French Presidency. The method adopted for this exercise differs from previous EU "strategies". In 2016, the then High Representative, [Federica Mogherini](#), presented the *EU Global Strategy*, which had been drawn up on the basis of work done by her teams and in application of the rules normally applied in the institutions. While this *Strategy* may have been presented and welcomed, it was not put to a vote in the European Parliament.

For the *Strategic Compass* a different method has been adopted, namely an inclusive, multi-phase exercise involving the Member States at each stage. As such, it marks a turning point. At first, this German-inspired initiative raised a number of questions in France, not least regarding the purpose of the compass. Its role became clearer as work on the text progressed. Was it intended to supplement the 2016 strategy, or something else? Today, there is no easy answer to this latter question because the geopolitical context has radically altered and has gone downhill since 2016. In addition, Europeans' perception of their strategic environment has substantially changed.

The first phase of work on this *Strategic Compass* consisted of analysing the threats. It was the first time that Europeans had shared their analyses of the threats facing them. Admittedly, it would have been possible to take matters further and conduct a common analysis of these threats. Instead, they chose to share data about their national threats, this data then being compiled and discussed at European level. Moreover, the intention is for this analysis of common threats to be regularly reviewed every five (or even perhaps three) years. Member States agreed on the principle of updating the document to adapt it to the strategic environment.

The second phase comprised "strategic dialogues", spearheaded by the Portuguese, as President of the Council, and by European Union Institute for Security Studies. This phase was the opportunity for Member States to take ownership of the aspects covered by the *Compass*. It was the chance to debate these subjects in depth and to produce a rather ambitious draft text, which was nevertheless realistic in that it was the joint work of the Member States.

Implementing European defence initiatives is now more a matter for Defence Ministers, since the High Representative is to stage an annual meeting of these Ministers, a new departure, and ensure capacity development, drawing up an annual report on progress made in *Strategic Compass* implementation. The High Representative's role has therefore changed, the person concerned now being entitled to revise

# The Strategic Compass and European diplomacy in action

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the document, which is no longer cast in stone, essentially to cater to changes in the geostrategic context .


European diplomacy is effective at European level, despite differences in the positions adopted by the Parliaments of the individual Member States. On societal issues of this type, Parliament’s role is to engage in debate and represent the views of the people. It is for this reason that the report proposes that the European Parliament should also regularly be consulted on defence issues, not least because of the heightened pace of geostrategic change. A three-yearly review of this report is recommended. As in 2016, however, the European Parliament has not been consulted over the *Strategic Compass*, which raises an important question. While European parliamentary cooperation does exist, it is not used to the full. There is no Defence Commission as such to address defence issues. In the end, these efforts within the Community enabled the 27 Member States to engage in real discussions consistent with the challenges of European diplomacy, a diplomacy that does not have to be unique but more a matter of mutual understanding, responsiveness and cooperation.

probably the one subject on which Member States have failed to disagree. There is a consensus on priorities with regard to resilience. This is progress in itself, because until now, Europe was working on a project without an established strategy, for example without any real capacity to counter the many hybrid threats (disinformation, cyberattacks or space). Finalising this essential feature of the Community document is consistent with the reinforced role of the European Commission, which is now very active in the field of defence and has substantial funds to finance its capabilities. This situation is conducive to shared reflection and investment.

While consensus over resilience has proved singularly successful, things are more difficult when it comes to outside partnerships, especially with partners the other side of the Atlantic. The idea of strategic autonomy has often been interpreted as meaning independence from the United States and not as freedom “to do what?”. This question is central to providing a way to overcome some of the current hesitations and to achieve the ambitions of the *Strategic Compass*. It is impossible to progress over European defence without acting consistently in coordination with NATO and the transatlantic partnership. European strategic autonomy should be interpreted as the capacity to take action, even when some of Europe’s allies have no desire to act, and to combine our action with that of our allies wherever possible, in other words, being able to act alone, but also to be a trustworthy and reliable partner. In today’s world it makes no sense to consider European defence and the transatlantic partnership as polar opposites.

An integrated approach to military capabilities needs to be further developed within the European context, not by opposing NATO, but as a method of favouring common security. Europe is now under the protection of NATO, and 21 of the 27 EU Member States are members of the transatlantic alliance. The two organisations operate on the basis of cooperation, not competition. Article 5 of the NATO Charter and Article 42.7 of the TEU contain a mutual assistance clause. The EU has, however, the ability to conduct military operations, for which its Member States deploy troops, despite differences in their levels of military expenditure. That said, European strategic autonomy is an opportunity to review of our partnerships, including that with NATO. Today, if Europe wants to offer its citizens better protection, it cannot afford not to invest in defence, innovation, new technologies, operational capabilities, and must lessen its dependence on others. A powerful and united Europe will be a strong partner for the transatlantic alliance.

Work on the *Strategic Compass*, in many ways a rich and innovative development, again begs the question of the true political intentions of the Member States. What exactly will they do with the *Compass*? By referring to Article 44 of the TEU, it should be possible for the EU move forward without all 27 Member States having to commit to jointly decided action. This opens up encouraging possibilities, but past examples, such as the announcements on rapid reaction capability, planning structures, or Permanent Structured Cooperation, suggest that cautious optimism should be the order of the day. Nevertheless, the extent of the European countries’ involvement in work on developing the *Compass* would seem to augur well for the future.



Source: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service

## Europe’s Strategic Compass on the international stage

To begin with, it is important to understand that, in today’s constantly changing world and in the face of the successive and increasingly violent crises, the individual European States owe their strength to being members of the European Community. It is, therefore, in their common interest, regardless of their size and economic importance, for Europe to speak with a strong and united voice. This is what will give it the power and the respect it seeks. Presenting a united front does not mean ignoring the individual interests of the Member States. On the contrary it protects these interests. Europe shares common values and it is precisely because of these values of respect, dignity, dialogue and understanding that so many people are keen to join. The *Compass* is a further step towards solidarity. Resilience, one of the four pillars of the *Compass*, illustrates this unity within Europe, since it is

# Arms and Sovereignty Talks 2021

## EDITB and emerging countries: what strategy for France at the 2036 time horizon?

Interview with **Patrick Bellouard**, Major General, Engineer (retired),  
Former Président and Board member of EuroDéfense-France

**Patrick Bellouard**, former President of EuroDéfense-France and Director of OCCAR-EA (Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation – Executive Administration) from March 2008 to February 2013, was a contributor at Arms Days 2021. As an acknowledged expert in the field of European defence, his experience and analytical skills provide useful input to plans for the European Defence Fund (EDF). He has authored numerous publications on the subject and is regularly interviewed on issues related to the construction of Europe and, more specifically, European projects connected with the arms industry and defence.

### 1. Where do you position the European Union in today's ever-changing global environment? And what main challenges does it face?

Today, foreign affairs, security and defence matters are increasingly handled at European level, since the individual states do not have the capacity to take singlehanded action, especially in the longer term. In a changing global environment, greater solidarity among Europeans is a must.

**The world is still fraught with geopolitical tensions and conflicts** (China and the United States, Russia and Ukraine), not to mention instability in the Middle East and Africa (the Sahel). Then there are issues such as the North-South divide, global warming, and uncertainties regarding the position of some of our allies.

It has long been obvious that the United States is now focused on the Pacific and its own national interests and is prepared to challenge international treaties without a second thought. Nonetheless, the United States, under the **Biden** administration, will again be jockeying for position in relation to some of these treaties, especially the Iran nuclear deal. Meanwhile, Turkey, a NATO member, is acquiring air defence equipment from Russia.

European countries no longer have the military capabilities to ensure their own defence or to conduct sustained independent military operations. For example, France required military assistance from the United States and its European neighbours for its operation in Mali. Faced with uncertainties and threats, Europeans must either rely on the Atlantic Alliance, which has ensured the collective defence of Europe since 1949 (Article 5), or on the European Union, which has had an interest in defence for the last two decades. With the doubts about American commitment and recent unsettling developments in Turkey, Europeans are increasingly keen to consider homegrown solutions for their defence.

China and other large nation-continentals such as India will continue to go from economic strength to strength. A major event occurred in this connection at the end of 2020 with the signature of the "Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership" between China, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and 10 ASEAN countries. In total, these countries

account for 30% of the world's GDP, making them the largest trade bloc. US withdrawal from the "Trans-Pacific Partnership", under the **Trump** administration has clearly provided China with a golden opportunity. This will impact American and European maritime interests in the Pacific. What can a single European nation do against such powers?

### 2. Is the defence budget in Europe keeping pace with these geopolitical developments?

First and foremost, it is important to underline the specific nature of the military market. Unlike the civilian market, which is generally predictable, the military market is difficult to foresee and investment in development can be highly risky. It is therefore the client, in other words the state, that finances research and investment in development and bears the risks inherent in ordering the equipment it needs. Competition among supplier companies is limited at national level, resulting in *de facto* monopolies. Looking at arms programme expenditure, it is clear that research and development accounts for less than 10% of total programme costs for army equipment, 15 to 20% for naval equipment, 30% for combat aircraft, and 50% for nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. Some civilian equipment, such as Galileo or Ariane, is also state-funded in view of its strategic importance, market unpredictability and the associated risks. For a government, military equipment development is conditioned by the degree to which it is determined to secure national autonomy, witness the case of France. This requires a substantial defence budget.

Global arms spending has increased sharply in the last 25 years (+62% between 1996 and 2014), while in Europe, expenditure is largely on the decline. However, defence budget cuts in Europe have been halted in recent years, with states undertaking to up their contributions to close to 2% of their GDP. Several European countries have already reached this level or beyond. The European Defence Fund (EDF) will facilitate moves in this direction and, above all, improve the effectiveness and consistency of European outlay by encouraging cooperation.

### 3. To what extent does the European Commission allow for the specific nature of the military market in the structures of the EDF? Is its position evolving?

The European Commission created the EDF to support the goal of European strategic autonomy, a goal which featured in the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy unveiled by High Representative **Federica Mogherini** in June 2016. The EDF will both strengthen the EU's Defence Technological and Industrial Base to cater to global competition and help finance the development of the capability projects needed by Member States, now or in the future, to ensure the security of their citizens. The European Commission

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has clearly understood the fundamental nature of a risk-ridden defence market where project development costs are financed not by industry but by the clients, i.e. the states. The Commission's approach to defence is thus a far cry from the general free trade doctrine it advocates in the civilian sector. Given the links between the civilian and military activities of many European companies, the Commission will need to make a more general reassessment of its industrial policy (see below).

#### 4. Since 2016, the EU has become aware of the need for a measure of strategic autonomy. The term 'defence' is no longer a taboo in Brussels. Are Europeans conscious of the need for a degree of "strategic autonomy"?

Diplomacy and defence symbolise the sovereignty of the states, and industrial arms policy forms part of their toolkit. Europe is a union of sovereign states that have, since the late 1950s, decided to pool certain areas of their sovereignty (the euro, Schengen, etc). Until 2016, it did not show any interest in this notion of strategic autonomy, which is so important to France. It had no reason to finance defence R&D. The situation is, however, now changing.

#### Initially, European construction was aimed at promoting solidarity between nation-states to ensure peace on the continent.

Following the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954, the Treaty of Rome set in train a process of economic integration by creating the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, while not including transfers of sovereignty. European sovereignty and the primacy of European law, which was established by the European Court of Justice in 1964 and has never been contested, do not carry the same implications. For years, Europeans carefully avoided broaching the subject of defence. At the same time, they strengthened their solidarity in many areas and progressively transferred certain attributes of sovereignty (currency, Schengen, etc.) to the Union (created in 1993). This is what is called *de facto* solidarity.

Since 2016, major progress has been made following the presentation of the comprehensive strategy outlined by the HR [Federica Mogherini](#)<sup>1</sup> in June 2016. This introduced the concept of strategic autonomy for the European Union, which was a new departure. A number of actions have been started at European level, for example, the mutual defence clause, which was used for the first time by the then French President, François Hollande, in connection with military intervention in Mali. The nucleus of an operational general staff has been created. Twenty-five Member States now participate in the

**Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)**, subscribing to a number of undertakings such as raising their defence budgets to 2% of GDP and increasing the share of these budgets allotted to R&D investment. More importantly, on the industrial front, the **European Defence Fund (EDF)** has been established and its regulation approved, including both a research and a development stream. The EDF constitutes a tremendous step forward for European defence.

#### 5. Given the fragility of this process, what is France's position?

The level of cooperation between European States has remained low for more than 30 years for a variety of reasons, such as the lack of a common White Paper. There is no common analysis of prevailing threats and agreement on common military needs has to be obtained on a case by case basis. To achieve acknowledged strategic autonomy, the European Union needs to review not only the European States' investment levels but also the way they invest. For over 30 years, investment in European cooperation has remained extremely low, at around 20% of Member States' total defence investment. This means that 80% is invested nationally, very often in direct purchases from the United States, which soak up a large proportion of the defence budgets of European NATO members<sup>2</sup>.

While the PESCO was, in practice, created by the Treaty of Lisbon, it only became truly operational ten years later in December 2017. It still struggles to deliver tangible results.

Lastly, recourse to the recently approved EDF is hamstrung by one major problem: it is vital to avoid dispersal of funds and the European Union therefore needs to favour big projects that help boost capabilities without upsetting some twenty small or medium-sized Member States who would rather spread EDF funds more thinly. This is a true paradigm shift. The Commission will need to review its regulations regarding defence and security (possibility of monopolies, dual civilian and military role of equipment manufacturers competing for European Investment Bank (EIB) funding, and the ban on offsets for intra-Community transfers). In the long run, it will be vital to produce a European defence White Paper setting out the strategic goals of the European Union and defining the capabilities necessary to attain them and contain existing threats. Whence the importance of the Strategic Compass, which will help set priorities by fulfilling this role to a certain degree.

<sup>1</sup> High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

<sup>2</sup> Witness the pithy comment of [Florence Parly](#), French Minister of Defence, that the solidarity clause of NATO was Article 5, not Article F-35.

# The future of Europe's defence: between national sovereignty and collective responsibility

Conclusion delivered by **Cyrille Schott**,

Regional Prefect (honorary), former Director of the French National Institute for Advanced Studies in Security and Justice (INHESJ), and member of the EuroDéfense-France Bureau

This has been a very interesting and highly topical conference. The choice of venue is symbolic, since Strasbourg is the European capital of human rights and democracy and Europe's military hub, with the headquarters of Eurocorps. As [General Thonier](#) said this morning, Europe's heart beats here in Strasbourg.

- The current situation shows that total war is possible in Europe, a war in which a more powerful sovereign state attacks another. Admittedly, there have already been ethnic conflicts, for example in the Balkans or in Caucasia, but war on this scale seemed impossible. Yet, this is what has happened to the general stupefaction and public outrage.
- Faced with Russian aggression, the Atlantic Alliance, backed by the United States, clearly has an essential military role to play. In 2019, when [Heiko Maas](#), German Foreign Affairs Minister, declared: "This is our life insurance!", he was expressing a feeling widely-shared in Europe, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. Some EU States, like Finland or Sweden, that are currently not members of NATO are now considering joining.
- But this situation has laid bare Europe's weaknesses with regard to defence. There is no guarantee that NATO will continue to offer adequate security irrespective of who is American President, the political situation in the United States or the field of potential intervention. As today's conference has shown, and as EuroDéfense has always argued, Europe must develop its own defence.
- This defence should be complementary to that of the Atlantic Alliance, in line with the joint statement issued by Presidents [Macron](#) and [Biden](#) on 29 October 2021 after their meeting in Rome: "...the United States recognises the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence that contributes positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO."

Eurocorps is a good example of such complementarity in that it is able to act, and indeed acts, on behalf of both the EU and NATO.

- Russian aggression has spurred the Europeans into a degree of unity hitherto unknown, extending beyond the bounds of the Union itself, and has flagged up the EU's economic and financial strength through the weight brought to bear in the sanctions agreed. On the military front, the EU has also broken with past practice by allocating half a billion euros to deliver weapons to Ukraine. The mutual defence clause (Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union) has been examined with renewed interest by countries such as Finland and Sweden that have Russia as their neighbour and are currently outside NATO. Once again, it took a crisis for progress to be made and for years to be sliced off the time needed to realise that Europe cannot rely on economic and trade power alone, but must be able to defend itself and exert the power afforded by military strength and diplomatic capabilities.

Europe must rise above its differences, overcome its doubts and cast aside national self-interest or it will be defenceless, or rather, its individual States will be alone and helpless in the face of adversity! The crisis and the pressure it has created are having a positive impact on Europe, and what seemed important yesterday has faded into oblivion.



- The previous crisis – Brexit – spurred Europe into a number of breakthroughs: implementation of Permanent Structured Cooperation, which authorises those States that wish to do so to develop joint defence capabilities; establishment of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence; creation of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability, which may herald an operational general staff and, in addition to these EU initiatives, the European Intervention Initiative launched by France on the operational front. Defence has finally been included in the EU's budget, with the sum of eight billion euros being earmarked via the creation of the European Defence Fund. The Commission "inaugurated" this Fund in June 2021 through a package of decisions designed to boost defence industry innovativeness and competitiveness. Similarly, the European Peace Facility has now been included in the budget to support *common foreign and security policy* in its military actions. This facility will be used to help Poland resist aggression by supplying it with weapons. In addition, France and Germany decided to join forces with Spain in developing the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) programme and launching the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) programme. An agreement over pursuit of the Eurodrone project has also just been reached.

- Despite all these positive developments, an actual European army and real European defence capacities still remain a long way off. The Western armies' withdrawal from Afghanistan highlighted, by being disunited, how little impact the Europeans had on this decision, even though European troops outnumbered those of the United States.

- For Europe to be able to ensure its own defence, it will need to come to terms intellectually with the idea of going beyond its economic, trade and normative role and becoming a military and diplomatic power. It will need to acquire the necessary military capabilities, in other words armed forces, the capacity

## The future of Europe's defence: between national sovereignty and collective responsibility

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to command and plan them, and the political decision-making capability to use them, duly supported by a defence industrial and technological base. We, as Europeans, have the financial and military resources to defend ourselves and become a real power respected not only for its values but also for its strength. We have the resources, provided we have the determination!

- [Josep Borrell](#), the EU's chief diplomat, is currently supervising the "Strategic Compass" drafting process. This document is a sort of white paper on European defence and security for jointly assessing risks and devising a common approach to their management. The first version was discussed at the European Foreign Affairs Council in November 2021 and the second version in January 2022. The Compass should shortly be approved under the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

- The following issues are under discussion: creation of a rapid reaction force, establishment of proper headquarters, major joint investment and equipment acquisition programmes, protection of contested common spaces such as oceans, communications networks, space or the Arctic, and development of a common cyberdefence strategy.

- The scope of the Strategic Compass currently under consideration must be broadened, even at the risk of delaying its adoption until after this month.

In his address to the nation on 2 March, [President Macron](#) made it patently clear that European defence needed to be taken to the next level. He went on to say that he would be convening a Summit of European Heads of State and Government on 10-11 March. He also referred to the unity and determination demonstrated by our Europe, adding that it had entered a new era and that we should continue in this direction. For him, the war in Ukraine marked a turning point for both our continent and our generations.

These words echoed those of the German Chancellor, [Olaf Scholz](#), in the Bundestag on 27 February, when he declared: "We are at a turning point in history... Putin's war is a watershed moment." [Scholz](#) has signalled a veritable paradigm shift in German defence policy by breaking with the hitherto typical strategic circumspection or restraint. His comments on Europe notably included the words: "The challenge consists of strengthening the sovereignty of the European Union [...]. This is why I consider it so important [...] that the next generation of

combat aircraft and tanks be built here in Europe together with our European partners, and particularly France. These projects are our utmost priority."

Elsewhere, Member States have realised the importance of the mutual defence clause.

Eurocorps is ready for further empowerment and operation as an instrument of European defence.

The "turning point" mentioned by the French President and the German Chancellor, and the decisive changes that have occurred in recent weeks in Member States will need to be reflected in the Union's Strategic Compass.

- The European Union is the outcome of a project unequalled in the history of the world. It was not carved out on the battlefield or by princely intermarriage. It is a project motivated by freedom, shaped as much by ideals as by pragmatism. It remains unfinished and limitless. It is an original institutional structure, half-federal and half-intergovernmental. It is a Union with elements of sovereignty that also brings together a number of sovereign states. In peace terms, it is a miracle, since it rose from the ruins and has been instrumental in overcoming the deadly hatreds of the past. It is an area at times lacking in determination but undoubtedly the most peaceful and most open in the world, to the extent that many people living elsewhere aspire to become members. It is our common project and it is now emerging that one of the threats facing it is war. Serious warfare.

Europe should neither abandon its peaceful vocation nor its plans to extend its scope to the continent in a broader sense. But it must be capable of defending what it has created, this peaceful and democratic Union that is ours.

- Russian aggression in Ukraine is a threat that looms over Europe and its citizens. To counter this threat and dangers from other sources, we must arm ourselves (in both the moral and military sense) to take charge of our own sovereign destiny. This will require solidarity among all EU Member States and a shared determination among its peoples. Public opinion in Europe is increasingly conscious of the danger and the need to present a united front. If our conference has helped raise awareness and add impetus to our vital common determination, it will have served a useful purpose for us as Europeans.

**This symposium was organised in partnership with the "Club des généraux (retired) d'Alsace" et the CiDAN association, and with the support of Eurocorps.**

Two round tables were held to discuss the following subjects:

- **Is the current organization of security in Europe adapted to current and future challenges?**
- **What developments are desirable and/or possible?**

The speakers at these round tables were:

[Lieutenant-General \(rtd.\) Jean-Paul Thonier](#), who has taken part in a large number of operations in Africa and led the EU's ARTEMIS operation in 2003, [Lieutenant-General Peter Devogelaere](#), commander of Eurocorps, [Caroline Galactéros](#), PhD in Political Science, Lecturer in geopolitics, expert in

international relations and geostrategy. [Air Force General \(rtd.\) Jean-Paul Paloméros](#), a former Supreme Commander of NATO Allied Forces for Transformation. [Lieutenant-General \(rtd.\) Jean-Paul Perruche](#), former Director General of the EU Staff, [Admiral Matteo Bisceglia](#), Director of the Joint Organisation for Arms Cooperation (OCCAr), Major General, [Engineer \(rtd.\) Patrick Bellouard](#), former Director of OCCAr, [Air Force General \(rtd.\) Patrick de Rousiers](#), former Chairman of the EU Military Committee, [Jean-Marc Edenwald](#), in charge of EU and NATO Affairs at NEXTER, [Hartmut Bühl](#), Editor-in-Chief of "The European Security and Defence Union", [Admiral \(rtd.\) Jean Dufourcq](#), Editor-in-Chief of "La Vigie" and expert in strategic issues, [Cyrille Schott](#), former Director of the National Institute of Advanced Studies of Security and Justice.

# Counterterrorism: the challenges facing the European Union

With Gilles de Kerchove,  
Former EU Counterterrorism Coordinator (2007-2021)

There were three issues that the speaker wished to address, namely the threats looming over the EU, the EU's response, which is not always properly understood, and four challenges (among many others) he himself had had to face: data access, preventing radicalisation, the emergence of disruptive technologies and threats from outside the EU.

## 1/ The threats

The first threat is nothing new and requires little explanation. The threat from Islamic terrorism has, however, developed and changed in nature. It is now essentially endogenous and stems from people living in our midst. Gilles Kepel uses the expression 'atmospheric jihadism' to refer to people not linked to ISIS, who have not travelled to al-Sham yet are possessed of murderous intentions. In the case of recent events in Nice or the beheading of Samuel Paty<sup>3</sup>, the perpetrators were more fuelled by religious fervour than by ISIS ideology. The number of people concerned is relatively large (9,000 according to most recent figures from the French General Directorate for Internal Security [DGSI]). Although ISIS was defeated and the physical Caliphate destroyed in the Battle of Baghuz Fawqani in March 2019, the organisation remains resilient and lives on in Iraq, Syria, and through its offshoots in places such as Turkey, Afghanistan, Libya, the Sahel and the Sinai Peninsula. It is also moving into Africa (Congo, Mozambique).

On a parallel to this, there has been a recrudescence of far-right terrorism. While not all EU Member States may have been affected, the Scandinavian countries, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, as well as the United States, are among those that have. This terrorism is becoming increasingly international and interconnected and is organised in wide variety of different nationalist groups. The expression "50 shades of brown" springs to mind, to paraphrase a well-known book title. The link between these groups is the 'great replacement' or 'white genocide conspiracy' theory propounded by French author Renaud Camus.

To complete the picture, mention should also be made of violent far-left extremism, embodied by the likes of the black blocs and the more radical 'yellow vests', but this extremism is not on the same scale as Islamic jihadism.

Two recent phenomena are worthy of note: the impact of the pandemic and fallout from the crisis in Afghanistan.

### 1.1/ The pandemic

While the number of attacks did not increase during the pandemic, the number of cases of radicalisation did, for reasons ascribable to factors such as isolation and marginalisation and the influence of the Internet. There were no cases of bioterrorism nor outbreaks of COVID-19 in the camps in eastern Syria. In addition, in France as elsewhere in Europe, the politicians remained watchful with regard to potential threats, given events in Nice and Vienna, the murder of Samuel Paty and the withdrawal from Afghanistan. By contrast, American political priorities (China, Russia) are such that terrorism is no longer the concern it was 20 years ago.

The explosion of hate speech on social media is a disturbing new development and its miscellany of conventional terrorism, racism, anti-Semitism, and disinformation on the part

of both non-state and state players (Russia and vaccination policy, Turkey against "Islamophobic" France).

New forms of extremism are appearing, one example being technophobia (5G, telecommunications), which could worsen as technology continues to evolve (connected objects, the ubiquity of the Internet, facial recognition, etc.) and could combine with other extremist movements (ecofascists, anti-vaxxers, anarchists).

Last but not least, cybercrime is on the upsurge. While it has not yet reached the stage of cyberterrorism, it could well do so in the next five years.

### 1.2/ The Afghan crisis

There are potential threats in the medium term, if only because of poor health conditions and the humanitarian and economic situation in Afghanistan. We are likely to see a surge in emigration and jihadism not only from Afghans but also from people who fought in Syria and Iraq and who are currently in hiding in Turkey.

The Americans have negotiated a secret agreement with the Taliban, who have agreed to prevent Al-Qaeda from establishing a new sanctuary. This should provide two to three years of respite, but during this time Al-Qaeda will be rebuilding its forces and "franchises".

Withdrawal from Afghanistan is seen as a victory that will boost the troops' morale and is already fuelling jihadist propaganda.

In a country already a hotbed of criminal activity (drugs, arms and artefact trafficking), the situation in Afghanistan will go from bad to worse.

## 2/ The EU's response

For 50 years and since the terrorist attacks on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics (1972), counterterrorism has been a constant feature of European integration with regard to internal security. This has taken a variety of forms: concept of a European judicial area mooted by French President Giscard d'Estaing following the hijacking of an Air France plane in Entebbe, creation of a European Arrest Warrant after the September 11 attacks, development of a European strategy and creation of the EU Counterterrorism Coordinator in the wake of the Madrid attacks in 2004 and monitoring of access to metadata after the attacks in London. Institutionally, the shift occurred with the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 but with the Commission keeping a low profile and remaining in a supporting role, the fight against terrorism being the responsibility of the individual sovereign states. Apart from the possibility of developing internal security on the community model, the treaty is neither particularly ambitious nor federative, except for the creation of a European Public Prosecutor's Office for financial matters. Moreover, during negotiations the United Kingdom and France were insistent that intelligence should not form part of the responsibilities of the EU.

Politically, the shift really occurred seven years ago after the Charlie Hebdo shootings. In January 2015, the Heads of State and Government urged that further work should focus on three main areas: prevention, repression and the immediate vicinity of the EU (from Morocco to Turkey via the Western Balkans).

<sup>3</sup> French high school teacher brutally decapitated for having used the Charlie Hebdo cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad during a lesson on the freedom of expression

# Counterterrorism: the challenges facing the European Union

(Cont. from P.8)

Over the last seven years, the EU has been extremely active and has become a credible player in internal security:

- for prevention, a network of 6,000 field workers (teachers, internet experts, etc.) has been developed to raise awareness of radicalisation.
- for repression, Europol and Eurojust are systematically involved in all investigations and prosecutions. Frontex, the European Border and Coastguard Agency, now also fulfils security functions. A 6th Anti-Money Laundering Directive is due for publication and data exchanges among Member States are on the increase with the addition of biometrics.
- for relations with third countries, partnerships are being formed with those around the Mediterranean. This is a no easy task, given that the countries concerned are not on the same page with regard to the fight against terrorism. In 2014, activities of this type were not covered by the EU budget, whereas today 500 million euros have been earmarked to boost police and legal capacities with regard to intelligence and border controls.

## 3/ The four challenges

### 3.1/Challenge 1: data access

The first conclusion reached by the US Senate's 9/11 Commission of Enquiry was the importance of making use of all the information available by piecing together the different data. It was time the "Great Wall of China" between the FBI and the CIA ceased to exist. This conclusion led to the US creating an information sharing environment so extensive that, in Iraq, Private Manning was able to accede to secret information in diplomatic cables and [Edward Snowden](#) was able to do the same with NSA data.

If we want to create a system for sharing data, there are three factors on which we must build, namely data access, sharing and analysis. Considerable progress has been made over the sharing factor, but the real problem is that of data access. Data often relates to the private sector and may consist of financial information, passenger flight lists, tele-communications (metadata), internet (access to digital evidence) and military data (battlefield information).

There are two other factors that go make things even harder. Access to internet platforms is complicated by US domination. Large volumes of data are stored in the cloud and therefore protected by the Cloud Act. For instance, it took a whole year of international mutual legal assistance to obtain access to a WhatsApp exchange between two terrorists living in Belgium and planning an attack there. There is also the problem of the 4th Amendment to the US Constitution ("probable cause").

The second difficulty is linked to [Snowden's](#) 2013 revelations, which prompted strong reactions in Europe and led to a data protection "drive". The European Parliament and, particularly, its Committee on Civil Liberties, for which data privacy is a matter of great concern, stepped in to oppose several of the Commission's data collection projects. The Court of Justice also hardened its rulings in the wake of [Snowden's](#) revelations, these now being stricter, by contrast with America's absolute surveillance practices. The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) has also opted to take a hard line.

Another fallout of the [Snowden](#) affair is that US companies have generally adopted point-to-point data encryption so as not to alienate their clients in Europe (500 million users). The result is that the police and intelligence agencies have even greater difficulty in accessing data content. Previously, these agencies found a way round this lack of access to data content by using

metadata (who sends an email to whom, when, from where, etc.) but once access both data content and metadata is denied them, their investigations become complicated.

By contrast, data sharing has strongly developed and highly satisfying progress has been made, while, in terms of intelligence, the Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG) is very efficient. It would be helpful if this group were to step up its interaction with Europol.

As regards analysis, data analysts have to cope with massive influxes of data, a "tsunami" that represents a major challenge. Big data provides the means of rising to this challenge but only if there are sufficient skilled experts. [President Macron](#) has suggested that an Intelligence Academy should be created in Europe to train analysts, which is an interesting and useful idea.

### 3.2/ Challenge 2: preventing radicalisation

A great deal has already been done. For the last ten years, Member States have been taking action, with mixed results.

The EU has been working hard with Silicon Valley on Internet issues and its efforts have culminated in a number of undertakings and mechanisms, not least reporting mechanisms, and in strategic communications. While this was progress, it was also clear that partnership could not suffice and that obligations needed to be put in place. As a result, terrorist content must be taken down within an hour. At the instigation of [Commissioner Breton](#), legislation is being drafted in the form of the DSA to govern online intermediaries and platforms, and the DMA to govern competition.

Sadly, this legislation is imperfect on two grounds. First, the DSA does not address the issue of platforms that choose to deny all responsibility, claiming to be simply "conduits" for information. Yet their business model includes using the data at their disposal and making sure that users stay online for as long as possible. They use highly questionable recommendation engine algorithms, particularly involving hatred, violence and disinformation. They should at least be held accountable for amplifying illegal (terrorist and hatred) propaganda.

The second problem is that there is no collective European system for auditing algorithmic accountability. It would be a grave mistake to repeat the errors made with the GDPR by decentralising the application of these new regulations. Silicon Valley companies having subsidiaries in Ireland, it is the Irish Data Protection Authority which is responsible for controlling them on behalf of the entire EU. But because of understaffing and political considerations, the controls performed fall short of requirements. The CNIL (the French Data Protection Authority) would probably do a better job.

Over the issue of ideology, the experts (for example, the four in France: [Gilles Kepel](#), [Olivier Roy](#), [François Burgat](#), and [Farad Khosrokhavar](#)) are divided in their views. Of course, the phenomenon is complex and it would be unrealistic to explain it by means of a single combination of recurring factors. The only answer, therefore, is to adopt a pragmatic approach to each of the different factors, be it ideology, geopolitics, marginalisation or integration. Yet for ages, the European Union would have no truck with ideology. I was of the opinion that we should work with the Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, to contain the impact of Wahhabi and Salafi proselytising, first in Europe and, if successful, in the Western Balkans and the Sahel. I had numerous meetings with the Saudi authorities, the King of Saudi Arabia and people close to the Crown Prince. Our talks, although not easy, in some ways resonated with [Mohammed bin Salman's](#) desire to modernise his country. We embarked on discussions relating to evidence and facts, and encountered a

# Counterterrorism: the challenges facing the European Union

(Cont. from P.9)

degree of receptiveness on the issue of contentious texts circulated in their most medieval and conservative versions, and on that of funding.

At home, we gave thought to what we could do, within the constitutional rules of Member States, to establish an environment conducive to greater diversity in the interpretation of Islam in Europe. Since the Iranian revolution, some countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and others, have invested substantial financial resources in pressing for a single interpretation. If we were to compare this situation with that of an economic market, it would be fair to say that the Gulf has become the dominant market player. The objective is to restore the situation where there are a variety of interpretations, as was always the case since the emergence of Islam.

### 3.3/ Challenge 3: the emergence of disruptive technologies

Artificial intelligence, quantum computing, robotics, nanotechnologies, virtual reality and augmented reality, paving the way for the metaverse, militarisation of space, 5G, 3D printing, new materials, blockchain, synthetic biotechnology, are all private sector innovations, which is where standards are being developed that national governments are failing to produce. The United States are champions when it comes to exploiting their competitive strengths. Europe is not sufficiently represented in work on developing standards (for 5G, for instance). These standards are often developed covertly with Europe only discovering them when they reach maturity. The pace of these developments is amazing and their cost is falling. This has enormous impact on internal security.

The Commission was slow to react. The DG concerned only took action late in the day, despite the urgent need for investment. This is what led me to suggest to the Home Affairs Ministers that an "innovation hub" should be set up within Europol as a cooperation mechanism bringing together all European players in the field of internal security (Europol, Eurojust, Frontex, CEPOL, EU-LISA<sup>4</sup>) and potentially involving other defence protagonists in view of the importance of dual technologies. This suggestion was accepted by the Ministers concerned. There is an urgent need to improve threat assessment capabilities, to use these technologies for security and justice, and to consider their transformational effects. For example, artificial intelligence is a boon for cyberhackers. Remember what happened in Israel when a hacker broke into a hospital's computer system, tampering with patients' X-rays to make cancers disappear or non-cancers appear.

More recent threats come from the various "fakes": fake news, fake voices, fake images. As for the metaverse, we have still to grasp its full implications for funding, money laundering and radicalisation. There are further risks inherent in the Internet of Things and the convergence of threats. It is possible to imagine a scenario where a virus is produced in a laboratory located in the Cloud, transported by a drone using Galileo geolocation techniques and steered into position over a football stadium by someone with evil intents. A disaster in the making. More sophisticated attacks are to be feared in the years to come.

At the same time, these technologies make it possible to upgrade security and justice. Using big data, it is possible to pinpoint suicide risks from Instagram photos and messages posted on Facebook. The DGSI must be able to make more finite use of these technologies to identify weak signals indicating whether someone radicalised is about to resort to

violence. The security services should make greater use of facial and object recognition.

The last factor is the transformation effect: the banking and legal professions are cutting back on human resources; border controls have changed completely as a result of digitalisation; relations between the police and intelligence agencies will inevitably change. Meanwhile, Europol continues to gather intelligence even though the intelligence services would prefer it to stop. The boundary between the two opposing worlds of the dark web and encryption is bound to shift. This means redefining the way we work.

### 3.4/ Challenge 4: outside threats

Outside threats have four dimensions: jihad Africanisation, the role of Iran, whether or not to negotiate with terrorist organisations, and the legacy of the Caliphate.

#### Jihad Africanisation

It is vital to address the reasons for our failure in the Sahel, over and beyond the presence of French and European military troops, and to consider why we support governments that are often corrupt. The EU has revised its strategy in the Sahel and is becoming more demanding, but has failed to bring sufficient pressure to bear, especially in Mali.

#### The role of Iran

Under the Trump administration, we were keen to bring the JCPOA (Vienna agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme) back into force. We were not sufficiently demanding about Iran's behaviour in the region and its attempts to destabilise by spreading terrorism. ISIS is also the result of the ramp up of Iranian power.

#### Taboo question: should we negotiate with terrorist organisations or not?

Certainly not with the powerhouses of ISIS or Al Qaeda, but it could be an option with groups, particularly in Africa, that could be encouraged to engage in democratic debate by means of diplomatic mediation.

#### Another taboo question: the legacy of the Caliphate

Last July, I visited the Al-Hawl camp and al-Hasakah prison. Caliphate fighters and children are being held in horrendous conditions. From a security perspective, it is really in our interests to leave them there, knowing that the Kurds will not detain them forever? Are we being true to our values? Fourteen years ago, I helped [President Obama](#) shut down the camp in Guantanamo Bay. Surely there are parallels between the two situations?

### Conclusion - Will we win the war against terrorism?

The answer has to be no, if we remember that 20 years ago, Al Qaeda was just a few hundred fighters. Today, we have to deal with two organisations, Al Qaeda and ISIS, which have about 35,000 fighters each. The threat is better known but it is spreading into third countries, especially in Africa.

The risk is contingent on the balance between threat and vulnerability. While the level of threat may be increasing, we have made substantial progress with regard to vulnerability. Our intelligence services are now much more capable of nipping criminal activities in the bud.

<sup>4</sup> European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems

# EURODEFENSE international meeting

on the topic of

## “Solidarity and effectiveness”

The annual international meeting of the EURODEFENSE network (RIE), a network composed of 15 national associations in Europe governed by the same EURODEFENSE charter, took place this year in Paris from 19 to 21 May 2022.

The topic chosen this year was  
**“Solidarity and effectiveness”**

Here is the text that was included in the invitation to the RIE:

### 1/ European solidarity: an ever-growing necessity

While Europe has consistently put up a united front since Russia declared war on Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the conflict has seriously exacerbated the risks of instability on the continent and completely shifted the defence and security paradigm.

Russian hostilities came at a time when the European Union (EU) was putting the finishing touches to its “Strategic Compass” aimed at defining the external threats and dangers directly or indirectly menacing EU Member States (MS). Russian aggression embodies the behaviour of a once-great empire ready to go on the offensive to bring some of its former satellites back into the fold, with complete disregard for the international agreements that recognise and guarantee the independence of the States concerned.

The war in Ukraine may be the current focus of EU Member States’ attention, but threats from other former empires (China, Turkey) out to disrupt the world order established since the Second World War remain no less serious as a result.

Problems created by the situation in the Near East, Maghreb countries and the Sahel are also high on the list of priorities for Europe’s leaders, not least because of the obvious links with international terrorist threats.

To complete the picture, there are also factors such as hybrid and cyberattacks, fake news calculated to unsettle European public opinion and a disturbing tendency to renege on past promises.

The dangers from outside Europe are very real and make renewed solidarity a matter of necessity, naturally working in association with NATO, which has sprung back into prominence by virtue of Putin and his actions. But any association with NATO should not solely serve American military and industrial interests to the exclusion of all else.

Within Europe, the most recent crises (economic, health, energy and immigration) have flagged up the need to focus on intra-European solidarity and tackle the key issue of dependency on outside sources of supply. Similarly, it is now clear that the Europeans must work together on common, cross-cutting objectives, for example attempts to stem irrational use of the earth’s resources and to curb international crime (drug smuggling, human trafficking, money-laundering, illegal communications networks), to mention just two vital areas of action.

### 2/ Solidarity based on converging national policies

Europe’s salvation can and must lie in greater solidarity and unity. In the past, in the fields of currency (the euro, ECB),

trade (the impact of the single market), laws (precedence of European law, CJEU, ECHR), standards (GRPD), space (ESA, Galileo) and civil aeronautics (Airbus), Europe has shown that it is capable of concerted action. And all these developments have served to reinforce Europe’s internal cohesion and international capabilities.

The Strategic Compass will boost the European Union’s strategic autonomy. A stronger EU, with reinforced security and defence capabilities, will make a positive contribution to world and transatlantic security and will supplement NATO, which remains the backbone of its members’ collective defence, the two going hand in hand. The European Union needs to position itself as a key strategic protagonist within the Alliance with rapid coercive military and industrial capabilities, a shared culture, common plans and training exercises, the most similar possible conditions of engagement and operational command structures. The aim should not be to emerge as a dominant superpower but a military power capable of defending its own interests, protecting its citizens and contributing to world peace.

Russian hostilities will undoubtedly spur Member States into increasing their national defence budgets. This will logically shatter the peace dividend illusion and is inevitable, for events in Europe notwithstanding, the United States remain determined to target their defence policy essentially on the Indo-Pacific area in a bid to contain Chinese expansionism.

Greater awareness among Europeans should be flanked by efforts to “do better” through concerted action.

The issue of defence has clearly been gaining ground in Brussels. It is now time to encourage and coordinate the different initiatives not only to cover “conventional” types of warfare but also to combat “modern” forms of insecurity not waged on the battlefield but equally vital for the security of Europe and its peoples. The Strategic Compass should set off a process of ensuring the compatibility of the various instruments available for developing a Europe of Defence (PESCO/EDF/EII/CDP, etc.).

The real challenge is how to agree common approaches and decisions with regard to European defence to arrive at a form of sovereignty generally acceptable to Member States. A number of experts have suggested solutions such as those of relaxing the unanimity rule, creating a European Security Council, particularly including the principle of constructive abstention, and a Council of Defence Ministers independent of the General Affairs Council.

The final question concerns the extent to which Europe’s leaders are truly determined to counter the dangers of our modern world and therefore reinforce common European defence by broadcasting their intentions and educating their youth, rather than, as all too often, using the EU as a convenient scapegoat. Europe is not a soulless entity but an area that shares a **common destiny**. In the words of **Josep Borrell**, we need to “overcome our differences and develop a common understanding if we want to survive in today’s world”.

It can only be hoped that the war in Ukraine will be Europe’s wake-up call!

# EURODEFENSE international meeting - Paris 2002

(Cont. from P.11)

## Programme of EURODEFENSE International Meeting in Paris - 19 to 21 May 2022

The meeting began in the afternoon of Thursday 19 with a visit to the Musée Carnavalet, recently renovated and dedicated to the history of Paris, followed by a meeting at the Quai d'Orsay where the Presidents of the EuroDéfense associations were received by [Alexandre Vulic](#), Deputy Director of Strategic Affairs, Security and Disarmament, at the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs.

Friday, May 20 began with a morning tour of the Airbus site in Elancourt, near Paris, focusing on cybersecurity, secure communications and the "combat cloud", "massive intelligence" and space electronics. The Council of Presidents then met in the afternoon at the Ecole Militaire. The day ended with an official dinner at the Cercle national des Armées, place Saint Augustin.



Photo credit: EuroDéfense-France

The meeting ended with a public conference on Saturday morning at the Ecole Militaire, on the theme of RIE "Solidarity and Effectiveness". A record of this conference will be included in the next issue of the French letter.



**EuroDéfense-France Delegation**

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